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Abstract
The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tar-
i¤s implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade.
We investigate whether a regime of uniform tari¤s will be preferable to dis-
criminatory tari¤s when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction
in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product di¤erentiation and
asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries
will disagree on the choice of tari¤ regime. When the choice of import
tari¤s and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tari¤ regime
may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discrimina-
tory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance
with tari¤ agreement.
JEL Classication : F12, F13
Keywords : MFN clause, product di¤erentiation, discriminatory tari¤s
1 Introduction
Imperfectly competitive markets cause a deviation from the e¢ cient outcome
and provide a pretext for government intervention. In the trade literature it
is now well understood that a country can gain through unilateral intervention
in an imperfectly competitive market (see Brander 1995, Brander and Spencer
1984, 1985). According to models of strategic trade policy with immobile but
imperfectly competitive rms, there is a welfare gain for a country from shifting
rents to the rms in its jurisdiction (by using a subsidy) or to the government
(by using a tari¤). When several governments simultaneously intervene the out-
come can be mutually damaging. One response suggested in the literature to
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eliminate the unwelcome distortions caused by such unilateral trade policies is
the adoption of free trade since all countries would be better o¤ if none inter-
vened. Reaching such a position could involve signicant (and costly) adjust-
ment in many countries so a gradualist approach has much to commend it. An
intermediate step on the gradualist path toward creating a free-trade environ-
ment is for supranational institutions like GATT/WTO to impose harmonized
international rules.
An important example of a harmonized rule is the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) clause which is a signicant part of all multilateral trade agreements. It
has been described by Horn and Mavroidis (2001) and Hoekman and Kostecki
(2001) as one of the pillars of the WTO system. At the core of MFN is the
idea of non-discrimination or symmetric treatment for all1 . In other words,
if country A grants country B the status of MFN, it simply agrees to treat
country B no worse than any other country. Thus, it is natural to enquire into
the circumstances in which a country prefers a regime of MFN tari¤s to one of
tari¤ discrimination.
There have been several attempts in the literature to address this issue.
Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991) investigated optimal discriminatory
tari¤s imposed by an importing country on two foreign rms located in two
distinct exporting countries. They demonstrated that the importing country
prefers to impose discriminatory or preferential tari¤s, rather than a uniform
tari¤ across di¤erent countries, when the supplying rms have di¤erent produc-
tion costs. This occurs because the importing country has two instruments in
the discriminatory tari¤ regime compared with just one instrument with the
uniform tari¤ regime. A further result is that, with discriminatory tari¤s, the
tari¤ on the low-cost rm should be higher than that on the high-cost rm since
this reduces the total cost (marginal production cost plus specic tari¤) di¤eren-
tial between imports from di¤erent countries. In terms of production e¢ ciency,
production is diverted from the more e¢ cient to the less e¢ cient country under
a discriminatory tari¤ regime. The consequences of enforcing a uniform tari¤
regime by imposing the MFN principle will be an overall gain in production
e¢ ciency with distributional e¤ects favoring the cost-e¢ cient country.
It is important to ask whether these conclusions remain valid when the
exporting governments also actively engage in trade policy. Liao and Wong
(2006) allowed all three governments (the governments of the two exporting
countries and that of the importing country) to choose optimal policies that
maximize their welfare. For symmetric exporting countries producing perfect
substitute goods and engaging in Cournot competition, they found that the
importing country would choose a uniform tari¤ regime, whereas the exporting
countries would prefer a discriminatory tari¤ regime. In a similar setting, Saggi
and Yildiz (2005) consider the e¤ect of di¤erent cost and market structure, under
both Cournot and Bertrand competition between the producers in the exporting
1Although the GATT/WTO prohibits discriminatory import tari¤s, the means for such
policy exist within GATT/WTO rules. For example, discriminatory tari¤s can be imposed
through the enforcement of anti-dumping duty laws. Hence, there are many ways by which
the WTO/GATTs ban on discriminatory import tari¤s can be and is circumvented.
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countries, allowing for product di¤erentiation. In Saggi (2004, 2006) and Saggi
and Yildiz (2009) the e¤ect of entering an MFN agreement and the endogenous
formation of MFN clubs is considered in a model with Cournot competition
and segmented markets for a homogenous good when producers di¤er in cost of
production, and all countries produce, import, and export. The main nding,
assuming linear demand, is that the high-cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN
adoption, while the MFN adoption by the country with average cost production
is the most desirable. These are interesting results, but the assumptions of
homogenous products leaves open the question of whether they are robust to
the introduction of product di¤erentiation.
The contribution of this paper to the literature on optimal trade policy is
to extend existing analysis by introducing product di¤erentiation in a multilat-
eral trade setting in which every country produces, trades, and employs active
trade policy. We also move away from homogenous products and permit prod-
uct di¤erentiation. We have explored both Cournot and Bertrand competition
(though we only report results for Cournot in this paper). Using this general-
ized model we analyze the welfare consequences of two di¤erent tari¤ regimes:
a uniform tari¤ regime, as required by the MFN clause of GATT/WTO, and a
discriminatory tari¤ regime. We employ the model to address whether countries
still pay an export subsidy to their rms (as proposed by Brander and Spencer
(1985), and others) when it is known that the importing party will respond,
and whether countries achieve a mutually benecial outcome by agreeing to
constrain their choices through MFN. Our results show that with simultaneous
choice of tari¤s and export subsidies or with tari¤s chosen rst, the low-cost
country always prefers the uniform regime and the high-cost the discriminatory
regime. The preference of a country with intermediate cost level depends on
whether it is close to the low cost or the high cost. When the countries di¤er in
cost disagreement on the preferred regime will always arise. The outcome when
export subsidies are chosen before tari¤s is di¤erent: all three countries prefer
the uniform regime (unless there is considerable cost divergence between the
two higher-cost countries). At rst sight this seems to imply that MFN will be
implemented under this timing structure. However, after the tari¤ regime has
been announced and the subsidies chosen there is an incentive for each country
to renege on the MFN agreement and impose discriminatory tari¤s. This nding
implies that an international body can play a role in ensuring tari¤ agreements
are respected and provides motivation for the trading partners to make an in-
ternational commitment to follow an announced tari¤ regime (such as to follow
the MFN clause of GATT/WTO) which cannot be easily changed.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the model used
in the paper. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium for the discriminatory tari¤
regime and the uniform tari¤ regime when tari¤s and subsidies are chosen si-
multaneously, and provide a welfare comparison of the two tari¤ regimes. This
is undertaken rst for symmetric and then for asymmetric production costs.
In section 4 a similar analysis is provided for the situations when tari¤s and
subsidies are chosen sequentially. In section 5 we analyze the credibility of
agreement upon tari¤ regime when the choice of export subsidies is observed
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before the tari¤s are set. The main ndings are summarized in section 6. De-
tails of analytical derivations are gathered in the Appendix available online at
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/gdmyles/papers/pdfs/MfnStaApp.pdf.
2 Structure of Model
The structure of the model is the following: The world economy consists of
three countries that produce and trade di¤erentiated products. We refer to
country 1 as the home country, and countries 2 and 3 as foreign countries.
Each country is host to a single rm, and the home country is distinguished
by hosting the rm with the lowest production cost. The three governments
understand the structure of the oligopolistic industry and set credible tari¤s on
imports and taxes or subsidies on exports. The countries determine their policies
strategically. Firms can transport their product costlessly, but the markets are
assumed to be segmented for consumers.
The governments choose their policy variables (an export subsidy and an
import tari¤) to maximize the welfare of their countries. We analyze the in-
teractions among the governments as a non-cooperative multi-stage game. In
the rst stage, the countries announce whether they are using a uniform tari¤
regime (U) or a discriminatory tari¤ regime (D). Three di¤erent timing struc-
tures are considered for the later stages of the game. In game S, export subsidies
and import tari¤s are chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In game I,
import tari¤s are chosen rst, and export subsidies are chosen after observing
the tari¤s. In game E, the timing is reversed. The di¤erent sequences of moves
can be viewed as the di¤erence in timing, or in information structure, between
setting internal (subsidy to the domestic rm) and external (tari¤s on goods
produced abroad) policies. In the nal stage of the game, the rms move simul-
taneously with each rm taking the tari¤s and subsidies, as well as the decision
of the other rms, as given. All technology and demand information is known
to all parties. We derive the equilibrium of the game for the two tari¤ regimes.
The regimes are then compared in terms of the welfare of each country, as well
as global welfare dened as the sum of the welfare of all three countries.
The demand side of the model is derived from the utility maximization
problem of a representative consumer in each country. We follow the modelling
assumptions and notation of Yi (1996). Denote country is consumption of the
good produced in country j by qij . The utility function of the consumer in
country i is then given by
Ui = u (qi1; qi2; qi3) + Zi;
where Zi is consumption of a competitive numeraire good that can be costlessly
transported across countries. The sub-utility function is
u () = aiQi   
2
Q2i  
1  
2
3X
i=1
q2ij ; Qi =
3X
i=1
qij ; 0    1;
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where parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the extent of product di¤erentiation (see
Tirole, 1988). When  = 1 the products are perfect substitutes. As  decreases
the products become less homogenous, and at  = 0 the demands for the goods
are independent. From the utility function the inverse demand functions are
pij = ai   (1  ) qij   Qi;
where pij is the price received in country i for country js good.
Firm i has constant marginal cost, ci; since we do not deal with the entry
of rms, xed costs are set to zero for simplicity. The level of prot, i, for the
rm located in country i is
i =
3X
j=1
(pji   ci + sij   tji) qji;
where sij is the export subsidy imposed by country i for the good exported
to country j, and tji is the import tari¤ imposed by the country j on goods
imported from country i. Throughout the paper we consider only the case of
specic subsidies and tari¤s.2 The rms can compete by choosing quantities
(Cournot) or prices (Bertrand) in each country. We focus upon Cournot com-
petition; the results obtained for Bertrand competition are qualitatively the
same and the details are available from the authors upon request. For analyti-
cal tractability we consider identical demands (ai = 1 for i = 1; 2; 3); it is not
di¢ cult to extend the model to the analysis of markets of di¤erent sizes (say,
a1  a2  a3). To analyze the e¤ect of the cost asymmetry, without loss of
generality, we normalize c1 to zero and assume that c2  0 and c3  0.
For some combinations of costs and degree of product di¤erentiation the
rms may be driven to corner solutions where their exports to one or more
countries are zero. The analysis of later sections restricts attention to permissible
cost combinations that ensure all quantities are non-negative in equilibrium. In
fact, we choose to focus throughout on interior equilibria in which all quantities
traded between countries are strictly positive. We denote the permissible set of
non-negative costs that ensure all quantities are positive for a given value of 
by C ().
Country i chooses its import tari¤ and export subsidy to maximize the sum
of domestic consumer surplus, domestic prot, and revenue
Wi = u () 
3X
j=1
pijqij + i +
3X
j=1
tijqij  
3X
j=1
sijqji:
Under the discriminatory tari¤ regime country i can (potentially) impose dif-
ferent tari¤s on the imports from its trading partners. Under the uniform tari¤
regime the tari¤s must be the same, so ti = tij for all j 6= i.
2This is done for analytical simplicity. Note that in the competitive case, specic and ad
valorem tari¤s lead to the same outcomes, while under imperfect competition they lead to
di¤erent outcomes.
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3 Simultaneous Choice
In this section we consider game S in which the countries choose their tari¤s
and subsidies simultaneously. We determine the equilibrium of the game for the
two tari¤ regimes. The welfare levels of the countries in the regimes are then
compared to deduce preferences over regimes.
3.1 Discriminatory tari¤ regime
Solving the game with discriminatory tari¤s shows that the equilibrium subsidy
on exports from country i to county j is given by
sDSij = A
DS
0 () +A
DS
1 () ci +A
DS
2 () cj +A
DS
3 () ck; (1)
where the superscripts D and S denote the discriminatory regime in game S:
Coe¢ cients ADSn () are rational functions of : These functions, and all those
that follow, are detailed in the online Appendix. The level of subsidy can also
be written as3
sDSij =  
2 (1 + ) (2  )
2 + 
qDSji ;
where qDSji is the quantity exported from j to i. Since 0    1 and we
work only with costs in the permissible region where qDSji > 0, it follows that
sDSij < 0: The negative value of the subsidy means that all three countries tax
their exports. The equilibrium tari¤ set by country i on imports from county j
is
tDSij = B
DS
0 () +B
DS
1 () ci +B
DS
2 () cj +B
DS
3 () ck: (2)
The sign of the tari¤ depends on the conguration of costs and the product
di¤erentiation parameter and it is possible that the countries nd it optimal to
subsidize imports.
To understand these expressions it is helpful to begin by considering the
di¤erence between the export subsidies and the import tari¤s that country i
applies on trade with countries j and k. These di¤erences are given by
sDSij   sDSik =  CDS1 () (cj   ck) ;
tDSij   tDSik =  CDS2 () (cj   ck) ,
where CDS1 () > 0 and C
DS
2 () > 0. Thus, when the demands for the dif-
ferentiated products are independent ( = 0) the subsidies on exported goods
are equal for any cost di¤erential. Otherwise, exports to the lower-cost for-
eign country are taxed less heavily than exports to the higher-cost country. In
choosing a value for the export subsidy a country has to trade the enhancement
of competitiveness (implying a subsidy) against the gain from securing part of
the foreign tax base (implying a tax). The nding that export taxes are always
imposed shows that the second e¤ect dominates in this model, but the lower tax
3The authors are grateful to the anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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on exports to the lower-cost country reects the need for competitiveness. The
tari¤ imposed on imports from the lower-cost country are higher (or, the sub-
sidies are lower, when imports are subsidized) than that on imports from the
high-cost country. As a consequence, the discriminatory tari¤ policy has the
e¤ect of partly equalizing the cost di¤erences between the exporting countries
and extracting relatively more of the surplus of the low-cost exporter. It is this
feature of the discriminatory tari¤s that explains why we nd below that the
home country (which always has the lowest cost) ultimately prefers the uniform
tari¤ regime.
To explore the structure of tari¤s further we separate the analysis into three
cases: the policy of the home country, the policy of the foreign countries toward
the home country, and the policy between the two foreign countries. Consider
rst the symmetric case with c2 = c3 = c: With symmetry (2) shows that the
tari¤ set by the home country on imports from country i is
tDS1i (c) = B
DS
0 () +

BDS2 () +B
DS
3 ()

c; (3)
where BDS2 () + B
DS
3 () < 0, so that at c = 0 the tari¤s can only be positive
when BDS0 () > 0: Dene 
S by BDS0
 
S

= 0 so that BDS0 () > 0 for  < 
S
and BS0 () < 0 for  > 
S .4 If c = 0 the tari¤ is positive if  < S and negative
if  > S . This pattern for the tari¤ is also found in the other games so it is
worth developing the intuition. The choice of tari¤ always trades the incentive
to subsidize and, hence, reduce monopoly deadweight loss by increasing output
against the incentive to tax in order to secure part of the surplus obtained from
the exploitation of monopoly power. When the demands are independent (low
) the rms have greater monopoly power which they employ to secure prot.
The positive tari¤ then has two e¤ects: it gives a countrys rm an advantage
and allows it to secure relatively more surplus that remains within the country,
and it extracts some of the surplus obtained by the importing rms. When the
goods are closer substitutes ( high) there is less surplus to extract so it makes
more sense to use a negative tari¤ that encourages competition and allows the
country to increase welfare by reducing deadweight loss.
By continuity, the same conclusions hold for c su¢ ciently close to zero in the
symmetric case, and for ci; cj su¢ ciently close to zero with a cost asymmetry.
Fig. 1 illustrates how the sign of optimal tari¤s imposed by the home coun-
try on imports from the two foreign countries depends on the conguration of
production costs. The set of permissible costs is the area bounded by the two
black lines. As  increases the red line (tDS12 = 0) and the blue line (t
DS
13 = 0)
move toward the origin, so the set of cost parameters, (ci; cj) ; for which at least
one tari¤ is positive shrinks. The gure also shows that with symmetric costs
for the foreign countries the sign of the optimal tari¤s changes from positive
to negative (for  < S) once the production cost exceeds the threshold, cDS ,
found from (3)
cDS =
BDS0 ()
  BDS2 () +BDS3 () :
4S is dened by BS0
 
S

= 0, so S =
p
13 1
3
' 0:868:
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The intuition is that the low-cost country has a worldwide comparative advan-
tage. It nds it benecial to use some of the surplus generated by this advantage
to nance a subsidy that encourages supply to its market and therefore reduce
deadweight loss. Clearly, c  0 for   S , and, hence, the optimal tari¤s in
the symmetric case are negative when the goods are close substitutes.
[INSERT FIG. 1 HERE]
Now consider the tari¤s imposed by the foreign countries on imports from
the home country. In the symmetric case,
tDSi1 = B
DS
0 () +

BDS1 () +B
DS
3 ()

c:
At c = 0 the sign of tDSi1 is determined by the sign of B
DS
0 () so t
DS
i1 (0) Q 0
i¤  R S . By continuity, the same holds for c su¢ ciently close to zero in
the symmetric case, and for both c2 and c3 su¢ ciently close to zero with cost
asymmetry. When the production costs are close to each other the countries
subsidize imports if the goods are close substitutes and tax imports otherwise.
These observations are illustrated in Fig. 2 for  = 1.
[INSERT FIG. 2 HERE]
Finally, we analyze the interaction between the two foreign countries. With
symmetric production costs the expression for tari¤s simplies to
tDSij (c) =
(2  )  4  2   32
(2 + ) (4  ) q
DS
ji (c) ; i; j = 1; 2;
where 4  2   32 R 0, and, hence, tDSij (c) R 0, i¤  Q S . The outcome with
asymmetric costs is illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4.
[INSERT FIGS. 3 AND 4 HERE]
This analysis of (2) is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the discriminatory regime in game S there exists S such
that:
1. The signs of tari¤s on imports into the home country are determined accord-
ing to:
(i) if  > S then both tari¤s are negative;
(ii) if   S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tDS1i R 0 i¤ ci Q
BDS0 ()
 BDS2 ()
+
BDS3 ()
 BDS2 ()
cj :
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2. The signs of tari¤s on imports from the home country are determined ac-
cording to:
(i) if  < S then both tari¤s are positive;
(ii) if   S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tDSi1 R 0 i¤ ci R  
BDS0 ()
BDS1 ()
  B
DS
3 ()
BDS1 ()
cj :
3. The sign of tari¤s on imports between the two foreign countries are deter-
mined according to:
(i) if  < S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tDSij R 0 i¤ ci R  
BDS0 ()
BDS1 ()
+
 BDS2 ()
BDS1 ()
cj :
(ii) the converse is true if   S :
To summarize, all countries tax their exports. If product di¤erentiation is
su¢ ciently strong, the import tari¤s between all pairs of countries are positive
when the countries do not di¤er very much in production costs. When pro-
duction costs are su¢ ciently lower in one country compared to the other two,
then the low-cost country subsidizes imports from the high-cost countries, while
the two high-cost countries tax the imports from the low-cost country and from
each other. When the products are close substitutes imports are subsidized by
the lower-cost countries and taxed by the higher-cost countries.
3.2 Uniform tari¤ regime
We now analyze the optimal choice of policy under the uniform tari¤ regime
that represents an MFN agreement. Specically, the home country levies the
same tari¤ on imports from both foreign countries; however, there is no such
restriction on export subsidies. The same applies to the foreign countries.
By solving the game we derive the following expression for subsidies
sUSij = A
US
0 () +A
US
1 () ci +A
US
2 () cj +A
US
3 () ck
=  2 (1 + ) (2  )
(2 + )
qUSji ; (4)
and for tari¤s
tUSi = B
US
0 () +B
US
1 () ci +B
US
2 () (cj + ck) : (5)
The sign of the subsidy is clearly negative, so all three countries tax their ex-
ports. The di¤erence between the levels of export taxes applied to countries j
and k in the uniform tari¤ regime is given by
sUSij   sUSik = CS0 () (cj   ck) ;
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where CS0 () > 0. Hence, the exports into a lower-cost country are taxed
more heavily than the exports into a higher-cost country. This is opposite to
the situation in the discriminatory tari¤ regime. The intuition for this is that
the uniform regime forces the tari¤ on imports from the lower-cost country to
be reduced relative to the tari¤ on the higher-cost country. This reduces the
surplus extracted from the lower-cost country. To o¤set this e¤ect the export
tax on goods going to the lower-cost country is raised. The opposite argument
applies to the higher-cost country.
We again separate discussion of the tari¤s into an analysis of the policy of
the home country and then an analysis of the policies of the foreign countries.
From (5) the sign of the uniform tari¤ for the home country depends on the con-
guration of costs and the degree of product di¤erentiation. In the symmetric
case (ci = cj = c)
tUS1 = B
US
0 () + 2B
US
2 () c;
where BUS0 ()  0 if 0    S , BUS0 ()  0 if S    1, and BUS2 () < 0.
Therefore, the home countrys import tari¤ is negative when the products are
close substitutes (  S). Otherwise, under weaker substitutability (  S)
the tari¤ is positive for c su¢ ciently small and changes sign to negative when c
exceeds the threshold
cUS =
BUS0 ()
 2BUS2 ()
The e¤ect of cost asymmetry is illustrated in Fig. 5 for  = 0:5. The gure shows
that the sign of the uniform tari¤ is the same as those of the discriminatory
tari¤ when both foreign countries have low costs or high costs. When one
foreign country is high cost and the other low cost the uniform tari¤ averages
the discriminatory tari¤s.
[INSERT FIG. 5 HERE]
Now consider the optimal tari¤s imposed by a foreign country. In the sym-
metric case, country is optimal tari¤ is given by
tUSi (c) = B
US
0 () +

BUS1 () +B
US
2 ()

c: (6)
The coe¢ cient on c in (6) is negative (positive) when  is below (above) eS ,
where eS is dened by BUS1 eS + BUS2 eS = 0.5 Thus, for 0 <  < eS
the tari¤ is positive as long as c < ecUS () = BUE0 () [BUE1 ()+BUE2 ()] , and, sinceecUS ()  2 is outside the permissible set, the tari¤ is positive. For eS <  < S
the tari¤ is also positive for all c. Finally, for S <  < 1 the tari¤ is negative at
c = 0 and changes sign from negative to positive when cost exceeds the thresholdecUS (). Hence, when the products substantially di¤er the tari¤ is positive for
5The value of eS ' 0:34; so eS < S :
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any value of c. When the products are close substitutes the tari¤ is positive for
higher costs and negative for lower costs.
In the general case with a cost asymmetry the results are obtained directly
from the analysis of (5). As shown in the online Appendix, as long as  is
su¢ ciently small (0   < bS) the locus of points (ci; cj) : tUSi (ci; cj ; ) = 0	
is outside CUS () and the tari¤ is positive for all (ci; cj) 2 CUS (). The value ofbS is determined by solving tUSi = 0; qUSi;j = 0	 at cj = 0.6 For every value of 
above the threshold, bS , the tari¤ can be either positive or negative, depending
upon the conguration of costs. The signs of the import tari¤s for three cases
( < bS , S >  > bS , and  > S) chosen by the countries in the uniform
regime are shown in Figs. 68, along with those in the discriminatory regime,
for comparison. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the uniform regime in game S there exist
nbS ; So ; 0 <bS < S < 1; such that:
1. The sign of tari¤ on imports into the home country is determined according
to:
(i) if  > S then the tari¤ is negative;
(ii)if   S then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tUS1 R 0 i¤ ci Q
BUS0 ()
 BUS2 ()
  cj ;
2. The sign of tari¤s on imports into the foreign countries is determined ac-
cording to:
(i) if  < bS then the tari¤s set by both foreign countries are positive;
(ii) if   bS then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tUSi R 0 i¤ ci R
 BUS2 ()
BUS1 ()
cj   B
US
0 ()
BUS1 ()
:
[INSERT FIGS. 68 HERE]
3.3 Welfare comparison
The welfare levels of the three countries under the two tari¤ regimes are now
compared. The intention is to relate the preferences of the countries over the
alternative regimes to the level of cost.
As a rst step consider the di¤erence between the optimal policies in the
two regimes. For the optimal subsidies we have
sUSij   sDSij = CS1 () (ci   ck) ;
6The actual value is ^S =
p
11=3 1
2
' 0:457 :
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and for the optimal tari¤s
tUSi   tDSij = CS2 () (cj   ck) ;
where CS1 () > 0 and C
S
2 () > 0. The di¤erence between the subsidies in the
two regimes depends upon the position of the country in the cost ranking. In
the case of the home country (which has the lowest cost) the export tax is higher
under the uniform regime than the discriminatory regime. This is because the
export tax is being used in the uniform regime to compensate for the inability
to discriminate in the level of tari¤. For all three countries the tari¤ in the
uniform regime is averaging the tari¤s used in the discriminatory regime, and
the sign of the di¤erences follows accordingly.
With identical production costs in the foreign countries (c2 = c3 = c) the
di¤erence between the home countrys welfare levels in the two regimes is given
by
WUS1  WDS1 = ZS1 () c+ ZS2 () c2;
where ZS1 () > 0 and Z
S
2 () > 0. Hence, the home country strictly prefers
the uniform tari¤ regime if foreign marginal cost c > 0. If the production cost
in the two other countries is zero then import tari¤s and export subsidies are
identical in the two regimes, as is the welfare level of the home country. For the
foreign countries the di¤erences in the welfare levels are given by
WUSi  WDSi = ZS3 () c+ ZS4 () c2; i = 2; 3:
The expression on the right-hand side is negative, which implies that the foreign
countries strictly prefer the discriminatory tari¤ regime whenever production
cost is strictly positive.
With cost asymmetry the lowest-cost country again prefers the uniform
regime. The preference of the higher-cost countries depend on how much their
production costs di¤er.7 Intuitively, a continuity argument implies that if the
production costs in the foreign countries are relatively high and close to each
other, then both prefer the discriminatory regime. If the costs di¤er substan-
tially the country with lower cost will be better o¤ under the uniform regime.
This is illustrated in Fig. 9 for  = 0:5.
[INSERT FIG. 9 HERE]
The explanation for these preferences is found in the fact that in the dis-
criminatory regime the equilibrium tari¤s partially equalize the di¤erences in
production cost. This process is always to the disadvantage of the low-cost
country. The equalization cannot occur in the uniform regime, so the low-
cost country naturally prefers the MFN regime. In contrast, for precisely the
7The exact expression describing the switch of preferences in game S, as well as in games I
and E described in the rest of the paper, is rather cumbersome. The derivations are available
from authors upon request.
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converse reasons, the higher-cost countries are united in preferring the discrim-
inatory regime when their costs are not too dissimilar. When their costs are
dissimilar the discriminatory tari¤s will work against the lower-cost of the two
countries, so it is this country that will switch preference to the uniform regime.
Global welfare, dened as the sum of the welfare levels of the three countries,
is higher under the uniform tari¤ regime for all permissible costs and any degree
of product di¤erentiation. The increase in global welfare is explained by the fact
that discriminatory tari¤s shift production to high-cost countries so enhance
production ine¢ ciency. Moving to uniform tari¤s eliminates this e¤ect.
Proposition 3 With simultaneous choice of import tari¤s and export subsidies:
(1) The country with the lowest production cost always prefers the uniform tari¤
regime.
(2) When the production costs in the higher-cost countries are identical both
prefer the discriminatory tari¤ regime.
(3) When the production costs di¤er substantially, only the highest-cost country
prefers the discriminatory regime.
(4) Global welfare is always higher under the uniform regime.
4 Sequential Choice
In the previous section we analyzed the simultaneous choice of import tari¤s
and export subsidies. It is important to consider alternative timing structures
to ensure the robustness of the results. We now analyze games I and E in which
the choice of tari¤s and subsidies is made sequentially.
4.1 Tari¤s set before subsidies
In game I the countries rst set import tari¤s. Having observed the chosen
import tari¤s, the countries then choose their export subsidies. As we shall see,
this timing structure delivers results that are only slightly di¤erent from those
obtained in the setting with simultaneous choice.
Solving the game from the nal stage, the export subsidies in the discrim-
inatory tari¤ regime are given by
sDIij = A
DI
0 () +A
DI
1 () ci +A
DI
2 () cj +A
DI
3 () ck
=  2 (1 + ) (2  )
2 + 
qDIji :
Thus, in the permissible set with positive quantities the export subsidies are
always negative. The equilibrium tari¤ levied by country i on imports from
country j is
tDIij = B
DI
0 () +B
DI
1 () ci +B
DI
2 () cj +B
DI
3 () ck:
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The di¤erences in the subsidies and tari¤s between pairs of countries are
sDIij   sDIik =  CDI1 ()  (cj   ck) ;
tDIij   tDIik =  CDI2 () (cj   ck) ;
where CDI1 () > 0 and C
DI
2 () > 0. The qualitative properties of these dif-
ference are the same as in game S: when the demands for the di¤erentiated
products are independent the subsidies (or, indeed, taxes) on exported goods
are equal, for any cost di¤erential. Otherwise, exports to a lower-cost foreign
country are taxed less heavily than exports to the higher-cost country and the
tari¤ imposed on imports from a lower-cost country is higher.
As before, we consider the choices of the home country and the foreign
countries separately. In the symmetric case the expression for the tari¤ levied
by the home country on exports to the foreign countries can be written as
tDI1i = B
DI
0 () + 2B
DI
2 () c:
Since BDI0 () > 0 and B
DI
2 () < 0, the sign of the tari¤ will change as c
increases:
tDI1i (c) R 0 i¤ c Q cDI 
BDI0 ()
 2BDI2 ()
:
For all values of  the pairs

cDI ; cDI
	
are in the permissible set, so in the
symmetric case the home countrys tari¤ always changes sign from positive to
negative as c increases. The tari¤ on imports from the home country in the case
of symmetric costs is given by
tDIi1 (c) = B
DI
0 () +

BDI1 () +B
DI
3 ()

c:
All terms on the right-hand side are positive, which ensures the tari¤ is always
positive. The expression for the tari¤s on imports between the foreign countries
can be re-written as
tDIij (c) =
(2  )  12 + 2   42
(2 + ) (4  ) q
DI
ji (c) ;
and, therefore, in the symmetric case the import tari¤s between the foreign
countries are also positive.
The general case, with asymmetric costs, is described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 In the discriminatory regime in game I:
1. The sign of tari¤s levied by the home country on imports from foreign country
i is determined according to
tDI1i (c) R 0 i¤ ci Q
BDI0 ()
 BDI2 ()
+
BDI3 ()
 BDI2 ()
cj ;
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j.
2. The tari¤s levied by the foreign countries on imports from the home country
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are positive.
3. The sign of the tari¤s levied by foreign country i on imports from foreign
country j is determined according to
tDIij R 0 i¤ ci R  
BDI0 ()
BDI1 ()
+
 BDI2 ()
BDI1 ()
cj ;
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j. In particular, both tari¤s are positive when the production
costs are equal.
In the uniform tari¤ regime in game I the equilibrium export subsidy is
sUIij = A
UI
0 () +A
UI
1 () ci +A
UI
2 () cj +A
UI
3 () ck
=  2 (1 + ) (2  )
(2 + )
qUIij < 0;
and the expression for the uniform tari¤ chosen by country i is
tUIi = B
UI
0 () +B
UI
1 () ci +B
UI
2 () (cj + ck) :
The analysis of the tari¤s is given in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the uniform regime in game I:
1. The sign of the tari¤ levied by the home country on imports from the foreign
countries is determined according to
tUI1 R 0 i¤ ci Q
BUI0 ()
 BUI2 ()
  cj ;
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j:
2. The tari¤s levied by both foreign countries are positive.
The di¤erences in import tari¤s and export subsidies between the discrimi-
natory and the uniform tari¤ regimes are given by
sUIij   sDIij = CI1 () (ci   ck) ;
tUIi   tDIij = CI2 () (cj   ck) ;
where CI0 () > 0; C
I
1 () > 0; and C
I
2 () > 0. These results have similar
qualitative properties to those for the game S so the tari¤ on imports into a
higher cost country is larger under the uniform regime. The welfare compari-
son between the di¤erent regimes is the same as with the simultaneous choice,
described in Proposition 3. Hence:
Proposition 6 The preferences of the countries over tari¤ regimes in game I
are the same as in game S, as described in Proposition 3.
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4.2 Subsidies set before tari¤s
We now analyze the equilibrium in game E: In the rst stage the tari¤ regime
is announced. In the second stage each country chooses its export subsidy. The
countries move simultaneously, each taking the export subsidy of its competitor
as given but being aware of how the choice of subsidy will subsequently a¤ect the
tari¤s. In the nal stage, the countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose the tari¤s, taking the export subsidies as given.
Solving the game shows that the equilibrium export subsidies in the dis-
criminatory tari¤ regime are
sDEij = A
DE
0 () +A
DE
1 () ci +A
DE
2 () cj +A
DE
3 () ck
=  2 (3  )
 
6 + 2   2
12  2 q
DE
ji :
The subsidies are always negative. The equilibrium tari¤s are given by
tDEij = B
DE
0 () +B
DE
1 () ci +B
DE
2 () cj +B
DE
3 () ck;
where BDE1 ()  0, BDE2 () < 0, and B
DE
3 ()
BDE0 ()
 0.
In the symmetric case, with c2 = c3 = c, the tari¤s imposed by the home
country become
tDE1i (c) = B
DE
0 () +

BDE2 () +B
DE
3 ()

c:
Since BDE2 ()+B
DE
3 () < 0, the outcome is determined by the sign of B
DE
0 (),
which is positive for 0   < E and negative for E <   1.8 Hence, when
 is above E the tari¤ is negative. When  is below E , the home countrys
tari¤ is positive at c = 0, and by continuity remains positive as c increases up
to a threshold, cDE , dened by
cDE =
 BDE0 ()
BDE2 () +B
DE
3 ()
:
The tari¤ is negative for c > cDE . For the tari¤s imposed by the foreign
countries on imports from the home country we have
tDEi1 (c) = B
DE
0 () +

BDE1 () +B
DE
3 ()

c:
The coe¢ cient on c is positive, and therefore the tari¤ is positive for 0   < E .
For E <   1 the tari¤ is negative for c below a threshold, ecDE , dened by
ecDE =  BDE0 ()
BDE1 () +B
DE
3 ()
;
8E solves BDE0
 
E

= 0; so E ' 0:651:
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and is positive for c above this value. The tari¤s on imports between foreign
countries in the symmetric case can be written as
tDEij (c) =
48  84 + 82 + 143   34
(4  ) (12  2) q
DE
ji (c) :
The expression in the numerator is negative (positive) when  is above (below)
E . Therefore, with cost symmetry the tari¤s on imports between the two
foreign countries are positive for 0   < E and negative for E <   1.
These properties are qualitatively identical to those established for game S and
are summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 In the discriminatory regime in game E there exists E such
that:
1. The sign of the tari¤ levied by the home country on imports from foreign
country i is determined according to:
(i) if  > E then both tari¤s are negative;
(ii) if   E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tDE1i R 0 i¤ ci Q
BDE0 ()
 BDE2 ()
+
BDE3 ()
 BDE2 ()
cj :
2. The sign of the tari¤ levied by foreign country i on imports from the home
country is determined according to:
(i) if  < E then both tari¤s are positive;
(ii) if   E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tDEi1 R 0 i¤ ci R
 BDE0 ()
BDE1 ()
+
 BDE3 ()
BDE1 ()
cj :
3. The sign of the tari¤ levied by foreign country i on imports from foreign
country j is determined according to
tDEij R 0 i¤ ci R  
BDE0 ()
BDE1 ()
+
 BDE2 ()
BDE1 ()
cj ;
for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j.
In the uniform tari¤ regime the equilibrium subsidy set by country i on
exports to country j is
sUEij = A
UE
0 () +A
UE
1 () ci +A
UE
2 () cj +A
UE
3 () ck
=  2 (2  )R
E ()
10  2 q
UE
ji :
The equilibrium export subsidies are always negative. The di¤erence between
the two subsidies to countries j and k is
sUEij   sUEik = CE0 () (cj   ck) ;
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where CE0 () > 0. As in the previous games, in the uniform tari¤ regime
the exports to a lower-cost country are taxed less than those to a higher-cost
country. The equilibrium value of the uniform tari¤ set by country i is
tUEi = B
UE
0 () +B
UE
1 () ci +B
UE
2 () (cj + ck) ; (7)
where BUE1 ()  0 and BUE2 () < 0. For the uniform tari¤ set by the home
country from (7) we obtain
tUE1 = B
UE
0 () +B
UE
2 () (ci + cj) :
BUE0 () is positive (negative) when  is below (above) bE dened byBUE0 bE =
0:9 Therefore, tUE1 is non-positive when bE    1; otherwise, it is positive for
smaller costs and negative for larger costs.
When production costs in the two foreign countries are equal (ci = cj = c)
the uniform tari¤ set by the foreign countries are
tUEi = B
UE
0 () +

BUE1 () +B
UE
2 ()

c: (8)
The coe¢ cient on c in (8) is negative (positive) when  is below (above) eE
dened by BUE1
eE + BUE2 eE = 0.10 Thus, for 0 <  < eE the tari¤
is positive as long as c < cE () =  B
UE
0 ()
BUE1 ()+B
UE
2 ()
, and, since cUE ()  2 is
outside the permissible set, the tari¤ is positive. For eE <  < bE the tari¤
is also positive for all c, since on this interval all coe¢ cients in the right-hand
side of (8) are positive. Finally, for bE <  < 1 the tari¤ is negative at c = 0
and changes sign from negative to positive as cost increases above the threshold
cUE (). In particular, when demands for the products are highly independent
the tari¤ is positive for any value of c. When the products are close substitutes
the tari¤ is positive for higher costs and negative for lower costs. The general
analysis is given in Proposition 8. The situation is essentially similar to the
one in game S. In particular, the tari¤s levied by the foreign countries are
positive for small , whereas when the goods are close substitutes ( is above
the threshold, E , dened by solving

tUEi = 0; q
UE
ij = 0
	
for cj = 0, i; j = 2; 3)
the tari¤s can be either positive or negative, depending on the conguration of
parameters.
Proposition 8 In the uniform regime in game E there exist
n
E ; bEo : 0 <
E < bE < 1 such that:
1. The sign of the tari¤ levied by the home country is determined according to:
(i) if  > bE then tUE1 < 0;
(ii)if   bE then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tUE1 R 0 i¤ ci Q
BUE0 ()
 BUE2 ()
  cj :
9The value of bE ' 0:80:
10The value of eE ' 0:32.
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2. The tari¤ levied by both foreign countries is determined according to:
(i) if  < E then the tari¤s set by both foreign countries are positive;
(ii)if   E then for i; j 2 f2; 3g ; i 6= j
tUEi R 0 i¤ ci R
 BUE2 ()
BUE1 ()
cj   B
UE
0 ()
BUE1 ()
:
The di¤erence between the export subsidies and import tari¤s under two
regimes is given by
sUEij   sDEij = GE0 () +GE1 () ci +GE2 () ci +GE3 () ci;
tUEi   tDEij = HE0 () +HE1 () ci +HE2 () ci +HE3 () ci:
The di¤erence between this case and the previous two cases (games S and I)
is that the di¤erences in the export subsidies and import tari¤s between the
regimes depend on the production costs in all three countries. They can there-
fore be positive or negative for di¤erent combinations of parameters. Further
analysis reveals the following. (1) The export tax imposed by the home coun-
try is higher under the uniform regime for any cost di¤erential between the
foreign countries, whereas the import tari¤ is higher under the uniform regime
when the two foreign countries have identical costs. When costs are su¢ ciently
di¤erent the tari¤ on imports in the lower-cost foreign country is lower under
the uniform regime; the converse is for the higher-cost foreign country. (2) In
the symmetric case, the tari¤ on imports from the home country into a foreign
country are higher under the uniform regime when the cost is low, and lower
when the cost is su¢ ciently high; the same is true for export taxes. With cost
asymmetry in the foreign countries, the tari¤ on import from a home country
into a foreign country is higher under the uniform regime when the production
cost in the other foreign country is low, and is higher under the discriminatory
regime when the production cost in the other foreign country is su¢ ciently high.
The same is true for export taxes. (3) The export taxes and import tari¤s on
trade between the two foreign countries are always higher under the uniform
regime than the discriminatory regime.
The di¤erence in outcome between this game and games S and I is a di-
rect consequence of the timing structure. The key feature of game E is that
the subsidies can be used strategically to a¤ect the tari¤s that are chosen in
the next stage. The strategic e¤ect of the subsidies is important in both the
discriminatory and the uniform regimes. In the discriminatory regime the tar-
i¤s partially equalize costs, so reduce the competitive advantage of the low-cost
country. The countervailing e¤ect of the subsidy is then especially important
for the low-cost country. Equally, in the uniform regime the countries lose one
degree of freedom in their policy choice so the subsidies are used to compensate
for this loss.
The welfare levels of the three countries under the two tari¤ regimes are
now compared. This is rst undertaken for the case of symmetric production
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costs in the foreign countries and then for the case of asymmetric costs. The
di¤erence in the welfare levels of the home country under the two regimes when
ci = cj = c is given by a quadratic polynomial in c
WUE1  WDE1 = A1 () c2 +A2 () c+A3 () :
The coe¢ cients satisfy A1 () > 0, A2 () < 0, A3 () > 0, and A2 ()
2  
4A1 ()A3 () < 0. Therefore, this expression is strictly positive, which im-
plies that the home country always prefers the uniform tari¤ regime when the
production costs in the foreign countries are identical. For the foreign countries
WUEi  WDEi = B1 () c2 +B2 () c+B3 () ;
where B1 () > 0, B2 () < 0, B3 () > 0, and B2 ()
2   4B1 ()B3 () < 0.
This expression is strictly positive for small values of c; and switches sign from
positive to negative when c exceeds a threshold value. This is di¤erent from
the welfare outcome in games S and I: now in the symmetric case all three
countries prefer the uniform regime in a substantial subset of the permissible
set of costs for any degree of product di¤erentiation. The foreign countries
prefer the discriminatory regime only when costs are su¢ ciently high.
With cost asymmetry the home countrys welfare is again higher under the
uniform regime than the discriminatory regime. The preferences of the foreign
countries di¤er when the cost di¤erential between them is su¢ ciently large.
These observations are illustrated in Fig. 10 which shows how the preferences
of the three countries depend on the conguration of costs when the demands
for goods are independent, i.e. for  = 0. For larger values of  the picture is
very similar, but the area of disagreement on the uniform regime is smaller.
[INSERT FIG. 10 HERE]
5 Credibility of the announced policy
We have shown that when the import tari¤s and export subsidies are chosen
simultaneously, or the import tari¤s are chosen before export subsidies, the
country with the lowest production cost is always better o¤ under the uniform
tari¤ regime while the countries with relatively high production costs are better
o¤ under the discriminatory regime. The disagreement about the choice of
regime arises for a substantial set of parameter values. The situation when
import tari¤s are chosen after export subsidies is di¤erent: all three countries
prefer the uniform regime, unless one (or both) foreign countries has a very high
production cost.
It might seem that these observations suggest there are stronger grounds
for expecting the implementation of an MFN agreement when tari¤s are chosen
after subsidies. However, there is an additional issue that has to be addressed
20
before this claim can be asserted. The ordering of moves raises the possibility
that after the tari¤ regime (uniform or discriminatory) is announced and the
export subsidies have been chosen and observed, the countries may reconsider
their choice of tari¤s and deviate from the announced regime. The countries will
renege on the agreement to a tari¤ regime if this is benecial. This possibility
does not arise when tari¤s and subsidies are chosen simultaneously, or when
tari¤s are chosen rst.
We now show that, indeed, having announced the uniform tari¤ regime each
country has an incentive to deviate to the discriminatory regime after the export
subsidies are chosen, unless the production costs in two other countries are
identical (in which case the tari¤s chosen under the two regimes coincide). The
central result concerning the credibility of the announcement of a uniform regime
are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 9 When export subsidies are chosen rst then the agreement on
the uniform regime is not sustainable:
(i) Each country has an individual incentive to deviate to the discriminatory
regime.
(ii) A deviation by one country benets the higher-cost non-deviating country.
(iii) The welfare of the low-cost non-deviating country and global welfare fall as
a result of such deviation.
It is not surprising that there is an incentive to deviate. Under the discrim-
inatory regime a country has two import policy instruments, whereas under
the uniform regime it has only one. An alternative way of viewing this is that
the uniform regime is the discriminatory with an additional constraint on the
choice of tari¤s. If other countries choose the uniform regime then the additional
exibility of the discriminatory regime is always going to prove appealing.
6 Conclusions
We have addressed the question of whether trading partners can achieve a mu-
tually benecial outcome by following the MFN principle which involves an
importing country applying the same tari¤ to all imports from all exporting
countries. This principle is part of all multilateral trading agreements. The
MFN principle is seen as reducing distortions in trading patterns and providing
an important step on the path to liberalized trade. Moreover, it is usually seen
as being in the interest of a developing country to secure MFN status from a
developed country. The central component of our analysis is to embed MFN
within a model of strategic trade policy to investigate how it interacts with
other trade policies.
We have modelled trade policy in a discriminatory regime, in which tari¤s
can vary on imports from di¤erent countries, and in a uniform regime where
MFN applies and a single tari¤ is levied on all imports. We have also considered
three timing structures for the trade policy game. For each game we have
determined the optimal trade policy in the two regimes when countries act
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strategically in choosing their policy instruments and used this to construct
preferences over tari¤ regimes. In every situation there has always been a low-
cost country and two others that may higher costs. The equilibrium outcomes
have been related to the degree of substitutability between products and to the
cost asymmetries between countries.
Our results show that discriminatory tari¤s have the e¤ect of partially equal-
izing for cost di¤erentials, so the low-cost country always faces the highest tari¤s.
The countries also use export taxes to secure part of their trading partnerstax
bases. The chosen tari¤s in the uniform regime are an average of the tari¤s in
the discriminatory regime. With simultaneous choice (game S) and tari¤s cho-
sen rst (games I) the low-cost country always prefers the uniform regime and
the high-cost the discriminatory regime. The preference of the country with in-
termediate cost level depends on whether it is closest to the low cost or the high
cost. If the countries di¤er in cost then there is disagreement on the preferred
regime. What is surprising about these results is that it is the low-cost country
that prefers the uniform regime. The implication of this nding depends on
how the cost structure of the model is interpreted. In many discussions of MFN
it is seen as a benet that developing countries wish to obtain from developed
countries. If one interprets our model as one in which the developed country
has a better technology, and so lower cost, then our results show that it is the
developed that actually gains from the operation of MFN. In this case MFN
may not imply the allocation of benets that are often presumed. Alternatively,
one could interpret the developing countries to have lower cost (perhaps through
lower real wages). In this case, the gains of MFN do accrue to the developing
countries so that they should pursue MFN status. In contrast, the developed
countries would seek to maintain a discriminatory tari¤ regime.
The outcome with subsidies chosen before tari¤s (game E) is di¤erent In this
case all three countries prefer the uniform regime (unless there is considerable
cost divergence between the two higher-cost countries). At rst sight this might
be taken as suggesting that there is a good chance MFN will be implemented
if this timing structure is correct. However, after the tari¤ regime has been
announced and the subsidies chosen there is an incentive for all countries to
deviate and impose discriminatory tari¤s. Hence, the MFN principle is not
sustainable unless it is enforced by an outside body. This gives motivation for
the existence of international agencies with the role of monitoring and enforcing
tari¤ agreements.
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